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This study examines the use of management control systems (MCS) across different modes of 
innovation and the effects on firm performance. In particular, the study draws on Simons’ levers of 
control framework to investigate how top managers attempt to simultaneously balance exploration 
and exploitation, which place contradictory requirements on firms. Using data collected from a survey 
of top managers in 400 firms the study demonstrates that the patterns of use and interdependencies 
among control levers associated with enhanced performance differ depending on the mode of 
innovation. The findings show that control levers are independently associated with enhanced 
performance in firms that specialize in either exploration or exploitation, suggesting that levers 
operate as supplementary rather than complementary controls in these contexts. However, in 
ambidexterity firms, diagnostic and interactive levers are shown to have interdependent effects on 
performance. Furthermore, some evidence suggests that both the combined and balanced use of these 
levers contributes to generating dynamic tension necessary for managing contradictory innovation 
modes.  
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An emerging stream of research has revealed how management control systems (MCS) can play a 
central role in the management of innovation.1 Once considered to be detrimental to innovative efforts 
(Amabile, 1988; Damanpour, 1991), there is now growing consensus that formal controls, when 
activated in an enabling, facilitative and interactive fashion, increase the capacity of an organization 
to derive benefits from innovation (Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Jørgensen and Messner, 2009). However, 
most prior systematic investigations have considered only variations in the emphasis on innovation 
rather than the characteristics of innovation. As such, it is unclear as to whether the same control 
patterns are equally effective across different innovation types, or how MCS are employed when 
pursuing multiple and potentially contradictory innovation modes. As Davila et al. (2009, p. 284) 
note: 
 
Innovation is not a monolithic phenomenon but various processes that coexist in parallel, each 
one requiring different types of control systems. Yet, we know little about how management 
control systems vary across variations of these processes, how they are designed, how they 
are used, how they interact [...] 
 
One common distinction in the innovation literature concerns the allocation of attention and resources 
between exploitation and exploration. Exploitation entails “refinement and extension of existing 
competencies” whereas exploration requires “experimentation with new alternatives” (March, 1991, 
p. 85). As the structures and routines associated with exploitation are fundamentally different to those 
necessary for exploration, firms will often specialize (Gupta et al., 2006). Some, however, attempt to 
pursue exploitation and exploration simultaneously. Managing the competing tensions and 
inconsistencies imposed by these contradictory innovation paths is signified by the term ambidexterity 
(Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; Lubatkin et al., 2006). While a significant body of research has 
documented the environmental, structural and behavioral antecedents of exploration, exploitation and 
ambidexterity (Jansen et al., 2006; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008; Simsek, 2009), little consideration 
has been given to how top managers employ MCS in these different innovation contexts (see 
Cardinal, 2001, for an exception). 
 
Furthermore, researchers have only just begun to investigate the design and use of MCS in firms that 
jointly pursue multiple and contradictory strategic objectives. This is an important concern as the 
literature generally contends that the success of firms facing highly dynamic and competitive 
environments is dependent on their ability to balance conflicting requirements (Gibson and 
                                                          
1 Management control is defined as “formal, information-based routines and procedures managers use to 
maintain or alter patterns in organizational activities” (Simons, 1995, p. 5). 
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Birkinshaw, 2004; Simsek, 2009). To date accounting studies have provided insight into how firms 
design performance measurement systems when emphasizing both low cost and differentiation 
strategies. Recent research by Lillis and van Veen-Dirks (2008) and Dekker et al. (2013) show that 
joint strategy (ambidexterity) firms have more complex systems that emphasize a wider diversity of 
measures, reflecting managerial demands to balance rather than to tradeoff competing priorities. 
 
The current study extends these streams of research by investigating the patterns of MCS use by top 
managers for firms that either specialize in, or jointly pursue, exploration and exploitation. In this 
study, MCS are conceptualized in terms of Simons’ (1995, 2000) levers of control (LOC) framework. 
The LOC framework is particularly appropriate for this study as it explicitly draws attention to the 
interplay of controls in managing organizational tensions (Mundy, 2010). Apart from Widener (2007) 
broad-sample research has been primarily concerned with the effects of interactive control (Abernethy 
and Brownell, 1999; Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Bisbe and Malagueño, 2009; Henri, 2006; Naranjo-Gil 
and Hartmann, 2007), limiting our understanding of how and when the full range of control levers are 
activated or combined and with what consequence. Recent field work has, however, been quite 
insightful in illustrating how the levers of control function as an interdependent system (Chenhall et 
al., 2010; Frow et al., 2010; Marginson, 2002; Mundy, 2010). Building on these insights, this study 
investigates both the individual and complementary effects of control levers on performance across 
different innovation modes. Additionally, this study empirically distinguishes between the combined 
and balanced use of control levers in generating dynamic tension (Simons, 1995). Although recent 
case studies have elaborated on how managers attempt to balance competing priorities through MCS 
(Cardinal et al., 2004; Jørgensen and Messner, 2009; Mundy, 2010), the effects of balance between 
control levers has not been formally tested. 
 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature and 
develops hypotheses that associate the use of control levers with firm performance across different 
modes of innovation. Section 3 describes the research method followed by the presentation and 
discussion of results. The study concludes with an outline of the limitations of this study and 
directions for future research. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
Exploitation and exploration represent fundamentally disparate modes of learning and innovation 
(March, 1991). Exploitation is encapsulated by terms such as “refinement, choice, production, 
efficiency, selection, implementation, execution” while exploration is indicative of “search, variation, 
risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation” (March, 1991, p. 71). 
Exploitative activities are directed towards increasing the efficacy of the technical system by 
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leveraging experiential learning gained through the repetition of routines. Through successive 
iterations the organization makes modifications to established processes to increase the proficiency 
and reliability of task performances. This process of incremental learning reinforces and deepens 
organizational capabilities along a given technological trajectory (Benner and Tushman, 2002; He and 
Wong, 2004). Conversely, explorative activities involve the search for new and emerging markets and 
the development of novel prototypes and path-breaking technologies. This requires organizations to 
pursue radical departures from prevailing competencies and learnt routines, and generate a tolerance 
for slack, persistent experimentation and improvisation of practices (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; 
Jansen et al., 2006).2 
 
Although March (1991) contends that exploitation and exploration place fundamentally incompatible 
requirements on an organization, he nevertheless maintains that both are essential for long-term 
survival. Firms investing in exploitation to the exclusion of exploration risk becoming trapped in 
suboptimal positions when environments shift, while those engaging in exploration at the expense of 
exploitation often fail to develop adequate competencies to capitalize on initial advantages 
(Holmqvist, 2004; Levinthal and March, 1993). Researchers investigating how balance can be 
achieved between exploitation and exploration present two main adaptive strategies: ambidexterity 
and punctuated equilibrium (Boumgarden et al., 2012; Gupta et al., 2006). Firms pursuing 
ambidexterity attempt to simultaneously manage the contradictory requirements of exploitation and 
exploration, while punctuated equilibrium refers to cycling between periods of specialization (Gupta 
et al., 2006).3 Situational conditions may also allow for or necessitate continued specialization. Stable 
and predictable environments and commoditized product markets tend to provide greater returns to 
organizations that effectively capitalize upon existing technologies, while highly dynamic and 
competitive conditions that are subject to rapid product obsolescence require continual emphasis on 
explorative activities to ensure survival (Benner and Tushman, 2003; Simsek, 2009). Specialization is 
also achievable through inter-organizational relationships when firms control complementary 
                                                          
2 Exploration and exploitation are also closely related to other fundamental organizational tensions – e.g. 
incremental and radical innovation (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Davila et al., 2009; Tushman and O’Reilly, 
1996), local and distant knowledge search (Levinthal, 1997), single and double-loop learning (Argyris and 
Schön, 1978; Van de Ven, 1986), first-order and second-order competencies (Danneels, 2008), variation-
reducing and variation-increasing strategic processes (Adler et al., 1999; Burgelman, 1991, 2002) and 
environmental adaptation and adaptability (Weick, 1979). 
3 Prior literature describes two forms of ambidexterity, structural and contextual (Raisch et al., 2009). Structural 
ambidexterity refers to the partitioning of tasks between distinct subunits (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). In this 
approach the firm creates a dual structure where subunits develop unique competencies, cultures, systems and 
processes suited to the requirements of either exploration or exploitation (Duncan, 1976; Raisch et al., 2009). 
Contextual ambidexterity refers to the behavioural capacity of individuals to simultaneously address 
exploitation and exploration activities across the whole organization. This is achieved by “building a set of 
processes or systems that enable and encourages individuals to make their own judgments about how to divide 
their time between conflicting demands” (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004, p. 209). In both cases the literature 
recognizes that top management plays a pivotal role in achieving an effective balance and integration between 
competing strategic priorities (Simsek, 2009). 
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resources - the explorative efforts of one firm feed into the exploitative capabilities of another (Gupta 
et al., 2006). These positions are represented in Fig. 1. 
 
<Insert Fig. 1. about here> 
 
The remainder of this section considers how MCS are expected to enhance firm performance for each 
innovation mode by drawing on the LOC framework (Simons, 1995, 2000). The LOC framework 
describes four control levers – diagnostic, interactive, boundary and belief – available for top 
management to guide organizational activity. The focus on the use of controls by top management is 
appropriate as it is widely recognized that they have a pivotal role in the success or failure of 
innovation and learning in organizations (Davila et al., 2009; Simsek, 2009; Smith and Tushman, 
2005). 
 
2.1 MCS for exploitation and exploration 
2.1.1 Diagnostic control systems 
Diagnostic control systems are considered a negative control lever because they draw managerial 
attention towards unfavorable variances and potential mistakes made in the implementation of 
intended strategies. As such, diagnostic systems are associated with mechanistic administrative 
structures premised upon tight control and highly structured channels of communication (Henri, 
2006). This would seem to be consistent with the demands for efficiency implied by exploitation. 
However, greater performance benefits from exploitation occur when the firm is able to make 
continual but incremental adaptations to processes and activities, rather than the precise reproduction 
of pre-specified routines (Benner and Tushman, 2002). The risk with diagnostic control is that 
discussions triggered by negative variances lead to “corrective action at best” but at worst draw 
attention towards unproductive topics “such as the believability of the numbers or why things are not 
better” without any rectifying actions or improvements taking place (Henri, 2006, p. 534). 
 
In the context of exploitation there are a number of reasons why diagnostic systems would be 
beneficial for enhancing firm performance. First, unproductive discussions emanating from diagnostic 
mechanisms are likely to occur when managerial preferences are unstable or when objectives cannot 
be unambiguously codified into quantitative metrics (Chapman, 1997). As exploitation is anchored 
upon understandings of existing processes and capabilities, knowledge tends to be more explicit in 
nature (Abernethy and Brownell, 1999). This allows organizational goals to be clearly and precisely 
specified (Turner and Makhija, 2006). When goals are clearly defined and communicated they help to 
absorb uncertainty and direct attention towards desired outcomes (McGrath, 2001). Also, by making 
organizational objectives and progress transparent, diagnostic control systems foster mutual 
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commitment and coordinated action towards desired outcomes, leading to higher firm performance 
(Adler and Chen, 2011; Widener, 2007). 
 
Second, diagnostic control systems are “not simply a constraining influence on managers’ behaviors, 
because monitoring processes highlight problems and motivate managers to achieve their goals, 
sometimes through novel means” (Mundy, 2010, p. 501). As diagnostic systems specify only the 
desired outcomes, not the procedures that must be followed, they can provide sufficient space and 
flexibility for subordinates to experiment with incremental adjustments to their activities (Adler and 
Chen, 2011). By providing clear goals diagnostic control systems also narrow the field of search, 
increasing the efficiency of locating solutions to task related problems (McGrath, 2001). This focus 
encourages single-loop learning through increased depth, rather than scope, of knowledge, necessary 
to exploit existing technological trajectories (Argyris and Schön, 1978; He and Wong, 2004). 
Evaluation through targets is also effective for improving the mean performance of groups attempting 
to converge on a solution to a pre-defined problem (Cheng and Van de Ven, 1996). 
 
For exploration firms, emphasis on diagnostic control systems are unlikely to be associated with 
significant performance improvements. Exploration entails subordinate experimentation and search 
outside existing market and technological domains. This requires activities to be loosely connected to 
outcomes, as learning about unfamiliar terrain is often the result of behaviors that are not goal-
directed (McGrath, 2001). Some evidence suggests that diagnostic controls help to constrain 
excessive innovation and provide the focus and structure necessary to effectively realize emerging 
opportunities (Cameron, 1986; Chenhall and Morris, 1995). Yet over-emphasizing diagnostic 
mechanisms can redirect organizational attention towards minimizing performance deviations to meet 
short-term targets and shorten efforts in the discovery of new knowledge that ultimately limit 
potential returns to the firm (March, 1973; Osborn, 1998). Diagnostic systems also tend to be aligned 
with extrinsic reward structures, which can diminish intrinsic motivation required for creativity (Deci 
and Ryan, 1985; Simons, 1995). Furthermore, objectives for exploration are characterized by less 
precision and specificity, reducing the ability to use quantitative measures as a means for evaluation 
(Turner and Makhija, 2006). This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Emphasis on diagnostic control systems has a positive association with performance for 
exploitation firms. 
 
2.1.2 Interactive control systems 
Interactive control systems are formal information systems that are embedded within patterns of 
frequent and intense communication centered upon emergent opportunities and strategic uncertainties 
(Simons, 1995). In contrast to diagnostic systems, interactive systems are a positive control lever as 
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dialogue is forward-looking, facilitative and inspirational. This form of control has been found to have 
a positive effect on firm performance in settings characterized by innovation and change. For 
instance, Abernethy and Brownell (1999) find that hospitals undergoing strategic redirection have 
higher performance when budgets are used interactively, while Bisbe and Otley (2004) demonstrate 
that an interactive use of MCS increases the performance effects of product innovation in mature, 
medium-sized manufacturing firms. This association with firm performance is expected to hold more 
generally in an exploration context for at least two reasons. 
 
First, performance in exploration firms is dependent on the discovery of emergent opportunities and 
creation of new capabilities. Research has shown that much of this transpires through the autonomous 
experimentation and search activities of lower level managers dispersed throughout a firm 
(Burgelman, 1991, 2002; Marginson, 2002). To translate potential opportunities and novel insights 
into commercially viable outputs, however, requires more focused attention and a coordinated 
allocation of resources that only occurs when top management has recognized and integrated such 
opportunities into the strategic agenda of the firm. Through involving themselves regularly and 
personally in the activities of subordinates, interactive control provides top managers access to 
emergent patterns of activity, enabling the selection and investment of resources into those initiatives 
that display the most potential for delivering competitive advantage (Simons, 1995). Additionally, the 
nature of knowledge generated through exploration tends to be more nuanced, subtle, speculative and 
causally ambiguous than the knowledge developed in exploitative activities (Gupta et al., 2006). This 
tacit knowledge is less amenable to codification, necessitating verbal communication (Ditillo, 2004; 
Turner and Makhija, 2006). Using formal information systems in an interactive fashion facilitates the 
exchange of tacit knowledge that is relevant for guiding opportunity search and deriving performance 
benefits from new technologies and markets (Hall, 2010). 
 
Second, inertial pressures and cognitive biases tend to result in organizations retaining competencies 
and routines that have delivered successful outcomes in the past (Smith and Tushman, 2005; Leonard-
Barton, 1992; Levinthal and March, 1993). Firms pursuing exploration typically face competitive 
landscapes that are susceptible to technological shifts, such that optimization upon existing knowledge 
bases will provide only temporary advantage (Levinthal, 1997; D’Aveni, 1994). The potential 
performance distributions of these environments have longer right-hand tails, meaning that the 
greatest returns are available to organizations that actively engage in variance-increasing activities 
(McGrath, 2001). As interactive systems provide a permanent and open forum for debate, they serve 
as a catalyst to challenge the status quo and question the validity of current action plans. In doing so, 
organizations are more likely to break out of narrow search routines, increasing the performance 




Interactive control systems are unlikely to be beneficial for exploitation, where the more routine 
nature of activities and incremental innovative efforts result in less of an information deficit (Simons, 
2000; Galbraith, 1973). Interactive systems do not represent an efficient means of control for 
exploitation firms as they require more substantial resource commitments and managerial attention 
than diagnostic systems (Widener, 2007). Normal operating activities are disrupted by interactive 
control efforts if subordinates are encouraged to frequently pursue trial-and-error adjustments 
(Chenhall and Morris, 1995). Continually debating the underlying assumptions of performance 
metrics also undermines the validity and motivational potency of performance targets. These 
arguments are formalized as: 
 
H2: Emphasis on interactive control systems has a positive association with performance for 
exploration firms. 
 
2.1.3 Boundary control systems 
Boundary control systems are formal mechanisms used to delineate the acceptable domain of 
organizational activity (Simons, 1995). These systems are essentially proscriptive in nature, setting 
restrictions or minimum requirements on subordinate behavior, and circumscribing strategic actions 
by limiting the scope of opportunity search. Although the exertion of boundaries minimizes available 
latitude, this does not necessarily mean a reduction in empowerment or motivation (Adler and Chen, 
2011; Frow et al., 2010). Rather, this bounded autonomy helps to focus the attention of subordinates 
towards areas considered critical to the performance of current operations. This is effective for 
exploitation as employees are discouraged from seeking continual adjustments beyond optimal and 
timely solutions (Mundy, 2010). Boundary systems also minimize the risk of subordinates pursuing 
activities that undermine the reliability and continuity of established processes. This is important for 
exploitation firms as activities are often tightly-coupled (Benner and Tushman, 2002). 
 
Simons (1994) finds that boundary systems have an important role in facilitating strategic renewal, 
prompting managers to unlearn old routines and paving the way for new frames of reference to be 
adopted. This suggests that boundary systems have a role in explorative activities as well. However, 
over time boundary systems tend to restrict experimentation and testing of alternatives to only those 
domains that have been sanctioned by the organization (Simons, 2000). While this improves the 
efficiency of local search activities involved in exploitation, it is problematic for exploration as it 
results in portions of the environment being unexplored and untestable (Rodan, 2005). Although 
boundary systems provide focus for subordinate activity, setting rigid limits on the scope of search 
reduces the potential variety of experience and knowledge necessary for maximizing returns to 




H3: Emphasis on boundary control systems has a positive association with performance for 
exploitation firms. 
 
2.1.4 Belief control systems 
Belief control systems are “the explicit set of organizational definitions that senior managers 
communicate formally and reinforce systematically to provide basic values, purpose, and direction for 
the organization” (Simons, 1995, p. 34). Belief systems commonly take the form of mission 
statements, value statements, credos and statements of purpose (Simons, 1994). The purpose of a 
belief system is to encourage subordinates to adopt the values and objectives espoused by top 
management (Widener, 2007). Belief systems, such as mission statements, tend to be constructed in 
fairly general, value-laden terms, as they are designed to “inspire organisational search and discovery 
without prescribing the precise nature of the activities” (Mundy, 2010, p. 501). 
 
Belief systems are likely to have the performance benefits for firms pursuing exploration. First, as 
exploratory firms tend to operate in uncertain conditions it is difficult to explicitly codify boundaries 
since strategic contexts are subject to constant and unpredictable change. However, core values and 
beliefs present a relatively stable reference point for individuals to make judgments aligned with the 
strategic intent of the organization as events unfold (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993; Mundy, 2010). 
Shared values also provide a common basis of understanding, facilitating the exchange of information 
between organizational members with disparate experiences and knowledge, in order to arrive at new 
ideas (Hansen, 2002). Second, belief systems enhance the motivation of individuals in settings that 
require creativity (Simons, 1995). Adler and Chen (2011) argue that belief systems positively affect 
the identified motivation of individuals through the internalization of organizational values and 
purpose. Although it is intrinsic motivation that is considered to have the highest effect in generating 
novel outcomes, it is not mutually exclusive to identified motivation. As such, the internalization of 
values and strategic intent help to channel creative efforts towards value-generating projects without 
crowding out intrinsic impetus. Third, belief systems can help prevent the onset of organizational 
inertia (Simons, 1994). Belief systems permit departure from established routines and expectations 
when these have drifted from the underlying values of the organization (Mundy, 2010). Variance-
increasing behaviors, which are central to exploratory innovation, are legitimized through shared 
organizational values (Davila et al., 2009). 
 
Belief systems may benefit exploitation as shared values help to resolve conflicting interests and 
disagreements thereby facilitating concerted action towards specific targets (Jansen et al., 2008). 
Identification to group values and goals has also been shown to have positive effects on motivation 
and task coordination in contexts with routine activities (Adler and Chen, 2011). However, increasing 
the emphasis on belief systems is an unnecessary use of limited managerial attention, as control can 
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be more effectively accomplished through prescriptive means in stable contexts (Ouchi, 1979; Speklé, 
2001). Furthermore, placing too much emphasis on belief systems may result in negative returns for 
exploitation firms by encouraging opportunity-search that deviates too far from existing routines and 
competencies. Hence it is expected: 
 
H4: Emphasis on belief control systems has a positive association with performance for 
exploration firms. 
 
2.1.5 Combined use of control levers 
So far the association between the individual control levers and firm performance has been considered 
for exploitation and exploration firms. A central contention of Simons (2000, p. 301), however, is that 
“the power of these levers” resides not in how they are used in isolation but “rather in how they 
complement each other when used together”. This leads to the expectation that there are 
complementary effects between control levers, that is, greater emphasis on one control lever increases 
the returns received from the use of another (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995; Widener, 2007). This also 
implies that control levers used in isolation may be insufficient to enhance performance. Rather the 
reinforcing effects generated through using control levers in combination might be necessary to 
achieve significant performance benefits. 
 
Although interdependence is a key theme in the levers of control framework so far there has been 
somewhat limited insight into the circumstances in which certain combinations are most effective 
(Frow et al., 2010; Henri, 2006; Mundy, 2010; Tuomela, 2005). The preceding theory development 
suggests, though, that for exploitation firms, diagnostic and boundary control systems have mutually 
reinforcing effects (Mundy, 2010). Boundary systems minimize exposure to risk and emphasize depth 
rather than scope in opportunity search, consistent with exploitation, but in imposing constraints and 
enforceable sanctions they can decrease the incentive for individuals to innovate even incrementally. 
However, if subordinates are aware how boundaries connect to organizational goals they may be 
internalized and support identified motivation (Adler and Chen, 2011). As Mundy (2010) describes, 
diagnostic controls provide a crucial link with boundary systems by encouraging subordinates to 
search for performance improvements within an explicitly defined space, which is essential for 
successful exploitation. 
 
Boundary systems also tend to improve the effectiveness of diagnostic controls. Diagnostic controls 
communicate desired organizational outcomes, but leave unspecified how those targets are to be 
achieved. This provides subordinates room to experiment with alterations to existing routines and 
seek novel solutions to problems (Adler and Chen, 2011). Without explicit boundaries, subordinates 
have the latitude to make significant changes to existing routines or engage in excessive search and 
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experimentation, resulting in increased risk, operational discontinuity and wasted resources (Simons, 
1995). Having boundary systems that are clearly tied to enforceable sanctions are particularly 
important when subordinates are set challenging performance targets as it is in these circumstances 
that individuals are most tempted to bend the rules (Simons, 2000). By clearly articulating the risks 
and opportunities to be avoided, subordinate efforts motivated through diagnostic controls are more 
effective in exploiting existing product markets and firm capabilities. The above discussion leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
 
H5: For exploitation firms the use of diagnostic (boundary) control systems has a more 
positive association with performance the higher the emphasis on boundary (diagnostic) 
control systems. 
 
For firms specializing in exploration, belief and interactive control levers act as complementary 
systems to enable more effective opportunity search and realization of emergent initiatives (Mundy, 
2010; Simons, 2000). As discussed, belief systems are an important mechanism for motivating and 
guiding exploratory activity. But for emerging opportunities to result in higher firm performance they 
need to be translated into the strategic agenda of the firm. Through interactive control managers are 
able to provide increased resources and structure to those initiatives that hold the most potential 
(Simons, 1995). Without interactive controls, the novel and creative outputs inspired by belief 
systems may take significantly longer, or even fail, to be effectively realized. Additionally, interactive 
controls are more likely to be effective when there is a consensus among members on the fundamental 
values and purpose of the organization (Widener, 2007). When individuals hold divergent values and 
beliefs attempts to encourage open information exchange and debate can lead to conflict that is 
divisive, impeding the ability of the firm to interpret and respond to environmental uncertainties 
(Sorensen, 2002). Disagreements over expectations and objectives also hinder efforts to integrate the 
complex and non-routine tasks associated with exploration (Ditillo, 2004; Van de Ven, 1986). 
Through reinforcing a collective frame of reference belief systems increase the effectiveness of 
interactive controls in generating “focus, integration and fine-tuning” that enhance the performance 
outcomes of exploratory innovation (Bisbe and Otley, 2004, p. 715). Thus: 
 
H6: For exploration the use of interactive (belief) control systems has a more positive 
association with performance the higher the emphasis on belief (interactive) control systems. 
 
2.2 MCS for ambidexterity 
The control requirements for firms that simultaneously pursue contradictory and opposing types of 
innovation are expected to be fundamentally different from those that specialize (Simsek, 2009). 
Recent research on managing strategic contradictions posits that ambidextrous firms will be more 
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successful when opposing tensions are approached from a both/and rather than from an either/or 
perspective (Eisenhardt et al., 2010; Schreyogg and Sydow, 2010; Smith and Lewis, 2011). While the 
latter implies that a choice must be made between strategic agendas, as in the case of specialization, 
the former encourages contradictions to be embraced simultaneously (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; 
Smith and Tushman, 2005). In this way managers “recognize and accept the simultaneous existence 
of contradictory forces” through “paradoxical framing” rather than seeking resolution or elimination 
of those tensions (Smith and Tushman, 2005, p. 526). By embracing inconsistencies, any movement 
towards one side is cognitively countered by a feeling of being pulled towards its opposite, fostering 
an ongoing balance (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; Eisenhardt, 2000). If tensions are ignored or 
avoided, then the more proximate gains from structural alignment, and psychological biases favoring 
consistency and certainty, tend to result in resource allocations converging upon existing products and 
technological developments (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Levinthal and March, 1993). 
 
To effectively manage the competing tensions of exploitation and exploration requires control levers 
to be combined (Simons, 1995, 2000). Activating levers individually can result in certain strategic 
demands being avoided or traded off, leading to suboptimal resource allocation or drift towards 
exploitative investments (Lewis, 2000). Instead, it is necessary to use control levers in combination to 
generate a dynamic tension that encourages decision makers to simultaneously address demands for 
both innovation and predictable goal achievement (Simons, 1995). It is therefore expected that the 
complementary effect of control levers in producing dynamic tension enhances performance in 
ambidextrous firms, rather than the use of individual levers. While combinations have already been 
posited for exploitation and exploration firms, these are concerned with the mutually reinforcing 
effects of positive (interactive and belief) and negative (diagnostic and boundary) control levers. In an 
ambidextrous context what is required is the joint use of levers that represent countervailing and 
opposing forces. Although there are a number of possible combinations, diagnostic and interactive 
control systems tend to work together in guiding the implementation and formulation of strategy, 
while belief and boundary systems frame the strategic domain of the firm (Simons, 1995, p. 157). 
 
Dynamic tension from the simultaneous and intensive use of interactive and diagnostic controls 
stimulates dialectically styled interactions and debate (Chenhall, 2004). These interactions help to 
bring competing demands and opposing viewpoints to light (Van de Ven, 1986). In doing so 
organizational members are more likely to develop shared understandings and awareness of 
coexisting tensions, and be less inclined to seek either/or tradeoffs between competing priorities. 
Instead, such interaction motivates the search for alternate ways of doing things from a both/and 
perspective, leading to the integration and synthesis of opposing positions (Henri, 2006). Belief and 
boundary systems similarly operate in tandem to generate tensions surrounding the appropriate 
domains for opportunity search (Frow et al., 2010; Mundy, 2010). Simultaneous application of both 
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systems encourages organizational members to expand exploratory search while being cognizant of 
the risks that must be avoided to prevent disruption to exploitative routines. This ongoing tension 
between autonomy and accountability motivates individuals to continually assess when existing 
boundaries need to be breached to adapt to or take advantage of shifting environmental conditions, or 
when opportunity search must be limited to avoid excessive risk exposure. Thus the following 
hypotheses are posed: 
 
H7: The simultaneous use of diagnostic and interactive control systems has a positive 
association with performance for ambidexterity firms. 
 
H8: The simultaneous use of boundary and belief control systems has a positive association 
with performance for ambidexterity firms. 
 
The prior hypotheses reflect the magnitude or intensity of using opposing but interdependent levers. 
This signifies a preference for more of either control rather than less (Widener, 2007). An additional 
consideration is the relative emphasis given to each control lever. This relative emphasis constitutes 
the balance between levers. Based on case study analyses, Mundy (2010) contends that balance is 
central for dynamic tension that effectively contributes to organizational capabilities. Mundy notes, 
though, that the concept of balance has not been clearly addressed in formal tests of the LOC 
framework.4 The difference between the combined and balanced use of controls is illustrated by the 
following example (cf. Cao et al., 2009). Consider that Firm A has a score of 5 for interactive and 7 
for diagnostic controls, whereas Firm B has a score of 5 for both. Hypothesis 7 leads to the 
expectation that Firm A will receive a higher performance benefit as the combined magnitude of 
control use is greater than in Firm B. However, this does not account for the relative imbalance 
between levers. In an ambidexterity context, this may result in strategic tradeoffs that negatively 
affect performance as competing tensions are not afforded equivalent attention (March, 1991). 
 
More specifically, placing greater intensity on diagnostic controls relative to interactive systems 
inhibits experimentation and the search for new opportunities, and may cause discontinuities in the 
environment to be missed (Cameron, 1986; Chenhall and Morris, 1995). On the other hand, an 
imbalance towards interactive controls can lead to continual change preventing the efficient conduct 
of routine activities and a lack of focus on immediate contingencies (Chenhall and Morris, 1995). 
Placing relatively greater emphasis on belief systems may lead to the consumption of firm resources 
on excessive experimentation and search (Mundy, 2010; Simons, 1995). Conversely, an imbalance 
                                                          
4 Henri (2006, p. 537), for instance, discusses dynamic tension resulting from using diagnostic and interactive 
systems simultaneously and intensively as well as from their balanced use. However, Henri models dynamic 
tension as a product term, reflecting intensity of combined use rather than the relative balance between levers. 
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towards boundary systems diminishes motivation to seek alternate solutions with higher payoffs and 
impedes adaptation in dynamic environments (Mundy, 2010). In summary, while the simultaneous 
and intensive use of levers that represent positive and negative forces helps to create the necessary 
tension to manage competing demands (Henri, 2006, p. 537), an imbalance between jointly activated 
levers disrupts this capability, leading to unintended consequences that negatively impact the 
performance of ambidexterity firms (Mundy, 2010). This leads to the following expectations: 
 
H9: An imbalance between the use of interactive and diagnostic control systems has a 
negative association with performance for ambidexterity firms. 
 
H10: An imbalance between the use of belief and boundary control systems has a negative 
association with performance for ambidexterity firms. 
 
3. Research method 
3.1 Data collection 
Data for this study were collected through a cross-sectional questionnaire sent to one member of the 
top management team of a firm.5 The target population consisted of a random sample of 1500 firms 
obtained from the database of CPA Australia. All firms are either independent companies or SBUs 
with a minimum of 100 employees and $20 million (AUD) in revenues. Cross-checking 
characteristics against Dun and Bradstreet and Hoovers databases resulted in 107 firms being 
removed, leaving a usable population of 1393. 
 
Administration of the survey followed four steps: pre-notification, initial mailing, first follow up, and 
second follow-up (Dillman, 2000). Respondents were contacted over a period of three months by 
telephone to create an interest in the survey and ensure that the firm and respondent were appropriate 
for the study. Questionnaires were sent within a week of the initial contact to the 911 respondents that 
agreed to participate. The first reminder was a postcard sent one and a half weeks following mailing 
and the second entailed a follow-up telephone call made to non-respondents after three weeks. A total 
of 421 questionnaires were received, yielding a response rate of 46.2 percent. Some questionnaires 
cannot be used in the analysis due to significant missing data or the firm not meeting the criteria of the 
study. This results in 400 usable responses.6 Demographic data are displayed in Table 1. 
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
                                                          
5 Top management team is defined as the top two levels of an organization’s hierarchy (Henri, 2006). 
6 Questionnaires containing items that appeared to have been missed inadvertently are retained. No item had 
more than 1.5% of missing variables. Analysis shows that data are missing completing at random (MCAR, 




Harman’s single-factor test is conducted to assess common method bias. The solution returns 14 
factors with Eigenvalues greater than one with cumulative variance of 71.8 percent. The first factor 
explains less than half of the overall variance (20.1 percent) implying that single-source bias is not a 
significant concern (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). To assess non-response bias the size and industry of 
respondent firms are compared to the sample population with no significant differences detected 
(p>0.05). Comparison of construct means and medians between the first and last 20 percent of 
responses received also show no meaningful differences. 
 
3.2 Variable measurement 
The variables for this study are based on previously validated constructs where possible. However, a 
number of these constructs needed to be refined in light of guidelines presented by Rossiter (2002) 
and Jarvis et al. (2003) for reflective and formative measurement models. Because of these 
refinements, significant emphasis was given to development and pilot testing of the survey 
instrument. Pilot testing involved ten interviews with senior managers from medium-to-large 
organizations. These interviews served to refine the selection of variables, analyze consistency in 
understanding of survey items, and to remove any undue complexity in item wording. To further 
establish content and face validity nine academics in the management control discipline reviewed the 
survey. Items used to measure each construct are detailed in Appendix A. All items are measured on 
Likert-type scales from one to seven.7 
 
Reflective measurement models are assessed through factor analysis, which reveals the relations 
among observable items and provides support for unidimensionality of constructs, and calculation of 
Cronbach’s alpha, which examines the internal consistency of constructs. Factor analysis is conducted 
with Maximum Likelihood extraction and oblique rotations.8 Results reported in Table 2 show 
extracted factors with no significant cross-loadings and satisfactory reliability (α>0.70). For formative 
measurement models, conventional statistical assessments of construct validity are inappropriate 
(Jarvis et al., 2003; Rossiter, 2002). In formative models directionality runs from the indicators to the 
construct meaning that indicators do not necessarily covary. Furthermore, as indicators are the 
defining facets of the construct removal of an indicator may alter the conceptual meaning of the 
construct and undermine its validity (Bisbe et al., 2007; Rossiter, 2002). Instead, Petter et al. (2007) 
suggest examining weights and multicollinearity of formative construct items. Very low or negative 
weightings can indicate that items are unrelated to the construct of interest, while highly correlated 
                                                          
7 The one exception is the control variable of firm age. Firm age is measured as an ordinal variable with five age 
brackets. As this cannot be interpreted as a continuous measure, firm age is included in the analysis as a dummy 
variable taking a value of one if the firm is more than 20 years old and zero otherwise (Sandino, 2007). 
8 Principal axis extraction also shows no significant differences in factor loadings. 
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items suggest that multiple items are tapping into the same facet of the construct. Principal 
components analysis for formative constructs reveals all weights are positive and above 0.30 (Hair et 
al., 2006).9 Multicollinearity is examined through calculation of variance inflation factors (VIFs). The 
highest VIF is 4.13. This is below the general tolerance of 10 suggesting multicollinearity between 
formative indicators is not a significant concern (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001). Descriptive 
statistics for variables used in this study are detailed in Table 3. 
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
3.2.1 Control levers 
Measurement of diagnostic (DIAG) and interactive (INT) control levers are assessed through top 
management use of budgets and performance measurement systems (PMS). Although multiple 
systems within a control package can be used in a diagnostic or interactive fashion, it was practically 
necessary to limit the research scope. Budgets and PMS are selected as these systems have been found 
to have wide application at the top management level and have been empirically associated with 
innovation and performance (Abernethy and Brownell, 1999; Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Henri, 2006; 
Widener, 2007).10 Respondents answered questions for interactive and diagnostic use of budgets and 
PMS separately. Scores are summated for firms that use both systems. Diagnostic control (DIAG) is 
measured through a reflective measurement model. Five items are identified to reflect the main stages 
of a conventional cybernetic control cycle as described by Simons (1994, 1995, 2000). Some of the 
items are adaptations of those used by Henri (2006) and Widener (2007), while others are based on 
Simons (1994, 1995, 2000). As shown in Panel A of Table 2 a single factor solution of the five items 
is obtained with satisfactory internal reliability (α = 0.89). 
 
Interactive control (INT) is based on the formative measurement model defined by Bisbe et al. (2007). 
From a thematic analysis of Simons’ work, Bisbe et al. argue that there are five defining dimensions 
of the construct: (1) intensive use by top management, (2) intensive use by operating managers, (3) 
face-to-face challenge and debate, (4) focus on strategic uncertainties, and (5) non-invasive, 
facilitating and inspirational involvement. Each dimension is captured using a single concrete 
indicator (Rossiter, 2002). The wording of these indicators is made with reference to prior studies 
                                                          
9 As there is no requirement for indicators to be highly correlated in a formative measurement model common 
factor analysis is inappropriate. In order to examine item weightings, principal components analysis is used as it 
retains the unique variance of each item (Petter et al., 2007). 
10 In the survey instrument budgeting is defined as the preparation of budgets, variance analyses and the 
forecasting of financials. Performance measures or performance measurement systems are defined as including 
both financial and non-financial indicators that measure multiple dimensions of performance (cf. Bisbe and 
Otley, 2004; Widener, 2007). 
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(Abernethy and Brownell, 1999; Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Davila, 2000; Henri, 2006; Naranjo-Gil and 
Hartmann, 2007; Widener, 2007). 
 
Boundary systems (BOUND) and belief systems (BELIEF) are based on formative measurement 
models. Analysis of Simons (1994, 1995, 2000) reveals that boundary systems contain four 
constitutive dimensions: (1) they define appropriate conduct, (2) they are used to limit search and 
experimentation, (3) they are actively communicated by top management, and (4) sanctions are 
applied to subordinates engaging in activities outside stated boundaries irrespective of the outcome. 
These attributes are defining facets of the construct rather than manifestations of a latent construct. 
For instance, an organization may have highly detailed codes of conduct, but this does not necessarily 
imply that top management are active in communicating these to subordinates, or that they apply 
sanctions irrespective of their outcome. Conversely, some firms may have little formalization but a 
strong, informally understood code of conduct. A review of the literature shows that belief systems 
also have four defining attributes: (1) they codify the core values of the firm, (2) they are actively 
communicated, (3) they are used to create commitment to firm objectives, and (4) they inspire and 
guide the search for new opportunities (Simons, 1994, 1995, 2000). Like boundary systems, these 
attributes do not necessarily share a conceptual commonality. For example, an organization may have 
a codified system of values, but these may not be written with the intent to guide the search for new 
opportunities or be frequently communicated. The four dimensions of both boundary and belief 
systems are captured using single concrete indicators (Rossiter, 2002). Some of the items are based on 
those used by Widener (2007). However, as her operationalizations capture only subsets of the 
defining attributes of these constructs, additional items were created based on the descriptions of 
Simons (1994, 1995, 2000). 
 
3.2.2 Exploration and exploitation 
Exploration (EXPLORE) and exploitation (EXPLOIT) are elicited through ten items. These items are 
derived from He and Wong (2004) and Jansen et al. (2006), and have been further validated in a 
number of subsequent studies (Cao et al., 2009; Jansen et al., 2009; Lubatkin et al., 2006). The items 
are interpreted as reflective indicators of a higher order construct. Results of a factor analysis using 
Maximum Likelihood extraction and oblique rotation are shown in Panel B of Table 2. The first two 
factors correspond with exploration and exploitation respectively (Cao et al., 2009; Jansen et al., 
2006; He and Wong, 2004).11 Cronbach’s Alphas are 0.77 for exploitation and 0.88 for exploration 
indicating satisfactory reliability. 
                                                          
11 One item (low cost) has a low communality (0.070). It also does not load significantly on the first two factors 
(<0.30), and hence is dropped from the analysis. This is consistent with the exploratory factor analysis results of 





3.2.3 Firm performance 
There has been some debate concerning the relative merits of subjective versus objective based 
assessments of firm performance (e.g. Selto et al., 1995). Chenhall (2003) reports that a number of 
studies find significant correlations between subjective evaluations and objective measures of 
performance, while Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1987) write that neither subjective nor objective 
indicators of performance are fundamentally superior in terms of providing valid and reliable 
measurement (see also Dunk, 1992). In this study firm performance (PERF) is measured through a 
subjective instrument. Five items based on a reflective measurement model are assessed: financial 
performance, sales growth (in new and existing markets), market share and overall performance (Cao 
et al., 2009; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1986; Widener, 2007). Panel C of Table 2 reveals that all items 
load on a single factor with satisfactory reliability (α=0.84). 
 
3.3 Method of analysis 
To examine the association between control systems and firm performance under different innovation 
modes, subgroups are created using a two-stage cluster analysis (Ketchen and Shook, 1996). Cluster 
analysis is an appropriate technique as it attempts to locate mutually exclusive groups within a 
population that share similar attributes. In the first stage the number of clusters and initial centroid 
values for EXPLORE and EXPLOIT are determined through a hierarchical agglomeration procedure 
using Ward’s method (Everitt et al., 2001). Review of the dendogram and agglomeration coefficients 
indicate appropriate solutions of two, three and five clusters. A five cluster partition is selected as this 
solution clearly distinguishes between exploitation, exploration and ambidexterity subgroups. In the 
second stage a K-means clustering analysis is conducted using the initial centroid values. This non-
hierarchical procedure fine-tunes the results by allowing cluster memberships to change (Hair et al., 
2006). Comparison of hierarchical and K-means procedures show a 91.25 percent similarity in cluster 
membership. 
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
Results of the cluster analysis are presented in Table 4. ANOVA and Tukey post-hoc multiple 
comparison results are also reported. Panel A displays the mean values of each cluster on the 
innovation modes of exploitation and exploration. Cluster 1 places a moderate emphasis on each 
innovation mode, while cluster 2 exhibits the lowest emphasis.12 Cluster 3 is primarily focused on 
                                                          
12 Clusters 1 and 2 are comparable to the “partially mixed” and “no clear preference” clusters reported in Dekker 
et al. (2013), with similar empirical distribution. It is difficult, however, to provide meaningful conclusions 
about the strategic positions of these groups. Cluster 1 might be analogous to Porter’s “stuck in the middle” 
position, while cluster 2 could be a “reactor” type (Miles and Snow, 1978). There may also be strategic priorities 
unrelated to exploration or exploitation innovation modes that these firms pursue. 
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exploration, cluster 4 on exploitation, with cluster 5 showing a high emphasis on both innovation 
modes. As the hypothesized relations of this study consider only firms that specialize in either 
exploration or exploitation, that is, place a high emphasis on one but not the other, and on those that 
pursue ambidexterity by placing a high emphasis on both exploitation and exploration, only clusters 3, 
4 and 5 are considered in the tests of hypotheses (Gupta et al., 2006; He and Wong, 2004; Dekker et 
al., 2013; Lillis and van Veen-Dirks, 2008). Panel B of Table 4 shows the average emphasis on 
control levers across clusters. The general pattern that emerges is that firms with higher levels of 
innovation place greater emphasis on control levers, with ambidexterity firms using controls the most 
intensively. Interestingly, there are no significant differences between control levers for exploration 
(cluster 3) and exploitation (cluster 4) firms. Although this finding does not contradict the hypotheses 
of this study (as they predict differences in the relative benefits, rather than on the relative emphasis, 
of control levers) the result is somewhat surprising, suggesting that firms in the sample are on average 
not in a (theoretically) optimal position regarding control lever choices.13 
 
Hypothesized associations are examined using OLS regressions for each subgroup. To test the 
relations posited in H1 to H6 for exploration (cluster 3) and exploitation (cluster 4) subgroups the 
following model is used: 
 
PERFi  = β0 + β1DIAGi + β2INTi + β3BOUNDi + β4BELIEFi + β5DIAGi * BOUNDi 
   + β6INTi * BELIEFi + β9-12(CONTROLSi) + εi     (1) 
 
where PERF represents firm performance and DIAG, INT, BOUND and BELIEF represent the 
emphasis placed on diagnostic, interactive, boundary and belief control systems respectively. The 
complementary effects of control lever combinations are modeled as bivariate interaction terms. 
Several control variables (CONTROLS) expected to be associated with firm performance in an 
innovation context are included in the regression model. Prior research indicates that older firms have 
greater accumulated experience allowing higher returns from exploitation, while younger firms have 
greater flexibility facilitating exploration (Jansen et al., 2006). Older firms are also more likely to 
survive – that is they have higher performance – than younger firms (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; 
Sandino, 2007). Firm age (AGE) is controlled for through a dummy variable taking a value of one if 
the firm is more than 20 years old and zero otherwise (Sandino, 2007). Larger organizations tend to 
                                                          
13 This might be a consequence of the difficulty of managing innovation, particularly for exploration-type 
investments where firms frequently experience limited success (Kanter, 2006). The literature also shows that 
factors other than innovation drive the choice of control levers (e.g. Widener, 2007). If the demands of 
innovation on control choice conflict with other contextual factors then this can result in suboptimal alignment 
(Gresov and Drazin, 1997). Finally, the result may indicate that other control attributes need to be considered. 
For instance, it may not be the relative emphasis on diagnostic control, but attributes such as the performance 
dimensions that are captured and whether and how these are tied to compensation, which show the most 
variance across innovation types (see e.g. Dekker et al., 2013). 
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have higher operating performance than smaller firms (Fama and French, 1995) and have greater 
availability of resources (Gooding and Wagner, 1985). Firm size (SIZE) is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the number of full-time employees. As external environmental conditions can affect 
potential returns from innovation investments, environmental hostility (ENVHOST) and 
environmental dynamism (ENVDYN) are included (Jansen et al., 2006). Environmental hostility is 
defined as the degree of threat from competitors for market demand, resources and growth 
opportunities (Dess and Beard, 1984; Miller and Friesen, 1983). Such conditions favor investments in 
exploitation while increasing the risk and reducing the potential returns from exploratory innovation 
(Levinthal and March, 1993; Zahra, 1996). Based on prior literature, environmental hostility is 
measured as a summated index of three dimensions (Miller and Friesen, 1984; Tan and Lischert, 
1994). As dimensions of a firms environment are not necessary related the construct is treated 
formatively. Environmental dynamism refers to the rate and predictability of change in the 
environment (Dess and Beard, 1984). Stable environmental conditions allow firms to maximize 
returns from exploitation while higher financial returns from exploration require dynamic 
environments that are disruptive to existing market and technological conditions (Jansen et al., 2006). 
Like hostility, environmental dynamism is also treated as a formative construct, and is measured as a 
summated index across five items on the rate of change and the degree of predictability (Chenhall and 
Morris, 1993; Gordon and Narayanan, 1984). Principal component analysis for ENVHOST and 
ENVDYN show that all item loadings are positive and well above the general threshold of 0.3 (Hair et 
al., 2006). The highest VIF calculated is 1.92. 
 
To assess the predicted associations in H7 to H10 for the ambidexterity subgroup (cluster 5) requires 
inclusion of terms to reflect the balance, or relative magnitude, between control levers. Balance is 
modeled as the absolute difference (ABS) between control lever emphasis (Cao et al., 2009; He and 
Wong, 2004; Ylinen and Gullkvist, 2012). The empirical model is as follows: 
 
PERFi  = β0 + β1DIAGi + β2INTi + β3BOUNDi + β4BELIEFi + β5DIAGi * INTi 
+ β6BOUNDi * BELIEFi + β7ABS[DIAGi-INTi] + β8ABS[BOUNDi-BELIEFi] 
+ β9-12(CONTROLSi) + εi       (2) 
 
where ABS[DIAG-INT] is the absolute difference between DIAG and INT variables and 




A correlation matrix is presented in Table 5. All correlations are below r=0.6 except for the 
association between DIAG and INT. However, this is consistent with correlations reported in prior 
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analyses (Henri, 2006; Widener, 2007). Table 6 presents the regression results for both exploitation 
firms and exploration firms. Models 1 and 3 represent the baseline regressions that include individual 
control levers and firm control variables. Models 2 and 4 introduce the hypothesized interaction terms 
for exploitation (DIAG * BOUND) and exploration (INT * BELIEF) as shown in Equation (1). Results 
for the ambidexterity subgroup are provided in Table 7. Model 1 represents the baseline regression. 
Model 2 introduces the hypothesized interaction terms for the ambidexterity subgroup (INT * DIAG 
and BOUND * BELIEF), while Model 3 adds the difference terms (ABS[DIAG-INT] and 
ABS[BOUND-BELIEF]) to the baseline model. Model 4 presents the full hypothesized model as 
shown in Equation (2). Prior to the construction of interaction and difference terms, independent 
variables are mean-centered to reduce potential effects of multicollinearity (Cohen et al., 2003). The 
maximum VIF across subgroup models is 2.36, which is well below the general threshold of 10 (Hair 
et al., 2006).14 
 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
 
Regarding the effects of individual control levers on firm performance for the exploitation subgroup 
(Table 6), Model 2 shows that the coefficients for DIAG (β = 0.314, p < 0.05) and BOUND (β = 
0.258, p < 0.05) are positive and significant, providing support for H1 and H3. For the exploration 
subgroup (Table 6), Model 4 reveals a positive and significant coefficient for INT (β = 0.317, p < 
0.05), supporting H2. The coefficient for BELIEF is positive but insignificant (β = 0.232, n.s.). H4 is 
not supported. 
 
H5 posits that the interaction of diagnostic and boundary systems has a positive association with 
performance for exploitation firms. The interaction term DIAG * BOUND in Model 2 of Table 6 is 
negative and insignificant, providing no support for H5 (β = –0.109, n.s.). H6 expects that the 
interaction of interactive and belief controls is positively related to firm performance for exploration 
firms. In Model 4 of Table 6 the interaction term INT * BELIEF is negative and insignificant (β = –
0.014, n.s.). H6 is not supported. 
 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
 
For the ambidexterity subgroup, the results of Model 2 in Table 7 reveal that the interaction of 
diagnostic and interactive controls (DIAG * INT) has a positive and significant association with firm 
                                                          




performance (β = 0.223, p < 0.05), providing support for H7. To further examine the interaction term 
a simple slope analysis is displayed in Fig. 2.15 Consistent with H7, the plot shows that firms that 
simultaneously combine high emphasis of DIAG and INT have higher firm performance. However, 
H8 is not supported, as the interaction of BOUND * BELIEF is negative and insignificant (β = –0.051, 
n.s.). Unexpectedly, the main effect of BELIEF is positive and significant in Models 1 through 3. 
 
<Insert Fig. 2. about here> 
 
H9 posits that an imbalance between the emphasis on diagnostic and interactive controls has a 
negative association with firm performance. The coefficient of ABS[DIAG-INT] in Model 3 of Table 
7 is negative and significant (β = –0.244, p < 0.05), providing support for H9. The balance term 
ABS[BOUND-BELIEF] is insignificant (β = 0.001, n.s.). H10 is not supported. As hypotheses 
regarding combined and balanced use of control levers may be alternate and competing explanations 
of performance in ambidexterity firms, Model 4 includes all hypothesized terms. Both interaction (β = 
0.169, p < 0.10) and difference (β = 0.186, p < 0.10) terms for DIAG and INT are marginally 




These findings contribute to the growing literature investigating the role of MCS in innovation 
settings in a number of ways. First, while prior research has found that flexible and interactive control 
structures are generally beneficial for innovation, the results of this study suggest that their 
effectiveness is dependent on the particular mode of innovation pursued by the firm. Specifically, the 
emphasis on interactive control use is associated with enhanced performance for firms engaged in 
exploratory innovation, but not for exploitation. This is consistent with arguments that more active 
roles of accounting are suited to contexts where there is significant uncertainty concerning the 
consequences of action (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004; Chapman, 1997). The results also support the 
conclusions of Bisbe and Otley (2004) that interactive controls affect firm performance by increasing 
the effectiveness of innovation processes (moderation effect) rather than through increasing the 
propensity of the firm to experiment with new products and technologies (mediation effect) (cf. Henri, 
2006; Widener, 2007). 
 
Second, the results indicate that the more passive and conventional uses of accounting controls have a 
positive role for innovation. In organizations concerned with local knowledge search and refinements 
to first-order competencies, greater emphasis on diagnostic controls can provide sufficient space and 
                                                          
15 Simple slopes are the partial derivative of regression equations containing interaction terms, conducted at one 
standard deviation above and below the mean (Cohen et al., 2003). 
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motivation for subordinates to experiment albeit in a more limited manner. Although this potential is 
recognized by Simons (1995), the literature has generally maintained that diagnostic controls limit the 
capacity of a firm to innovate as they are associated with and reinforce mechanistic control structures 
(Henri 2006). Instead the results of this study suggest that the use of diagnostic control is important 
for performance in firms seeking to exploit existing markets and technological capabilities (Benner 
and Tushman, 2003). 
 
Third, the study examines the effectiveness of the full range of control levers and analyzes potential 
complementary effects. Understanding interdependencies between levers is essential for 
organizational performance (Siggelkow, 2002), yet there has been relatively little investigation into 
how and when control levers are combined (Mundy, 2010). For exploitation and exploration firms the 
results suggest, however, that levers act as supplementary rather than complementary controls. 
Specifically, for exploitation firms, boundary and diagnostic systems are independently related to 
performance. A possible explanation is found in the framework presented by Davila et al. (2009, p. 
299), which considers control variation across incremental and radical innovation, and autonomous 
and induced strategic activity. Whereas diagnostic systems represent innovation agendas constructed 
through the deliberate planning activities of top management at the strategy formation stage, boundary 
systems provide structure for emergent activity at lower organizational levels during implementation 
phases. Although the two systems may be interrelated in an organization (Mundy, 2010; Widener, 
2007), the effect on performance of one system is not necessarily conditional on the other as they are 
often spatially and temporally separated. Similar reasoning is provided for interactive and belief 
systems, although the results of this study suggest that emphasis is required only on the former for 
enhancing the performance returns from exploration. In an exploration setting the internalization of 
shared values and beliefs is facilitated through the lateral interactions and mutual exchanges of 
organizational members, resulting in effective social control without the extensive use of formal belief 
systems (Ouchi, 1979). The interaction between informal and formal controls in innovation settings 
certainly requires further investigation. 
 
The interrelations between control levers are important in the context of ambidexterity. The results of 
this study are consistent with Simons’ (1995, 2000) core argument that dynamic tension generated 
from the interplay between opposing levers is necessary to effectively balance competing strategic 
priorities. Prior studies have suggested that there is universal benefit from using performance 
measurement systems both diagnostically and interactively (Widener, 2007), but particularly for those 
facing environmental uncertainty and valuing flexibility (Henri, 2006). The results of this study 
indicate that dynamic tension may be most beneficial for firms that explicitly face contradictory 
strategic agendas and coexisting pressures for flexibility, creativity and change, against those of 
consistency, efficiency and predictability. However, results do not support the expected 
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complementary effects of boundary and belief systems. Rather, there is weak evidence indicating that 
belief systems have an independent association with performance. Emphasizing belief systems may be 
particularly pertinent in an ambidexterity context as prioritizing core values provides a foundation for 
reconciling conflicting interests and priorities that surface through the use of other levers (O’Reilly 
and Tushman, 2008; Simons, 2010; Widener, 2007). 
 
Finally, the study provides evidence to suggest that not only are the simultaneous and intensive uses 
of diagnostic and interactive systems important for ambidexterity firms, but also the relative balance 
between these levers. This supports Mundy’s (2010) assertion that balance is essential for generating 
dynamic tension to effectively support organizational capabilities. In a context of innovation 
specialization the firm makes either/or decisions to emphasize certain types of activity over others. By 
placing greater emphasis on either negative or positive control levers, managers can push the balance 
towards exploitation or exploration. For ambidextrous firms, opposing tensions cannot be traded off 
but must be approached from a both/and perspective (Smith and Tushman, 2005). An imbalance 
between diagnostic and interactive control levers can result in either/or decisions that negatively affect 
the capacity of the organization to jointly pursue exploitative and exploratory innovations. It should 
be noted that results are relatively weak when assessing the relative effect of both combined intensity 
and balanced use of control levers. More research is required to gain a deeper understanding of how 




This study provides evidence on how patterns of MCS use associated with enhanced performance 
vary across different innovation modes. Much of the prior literature considers the association between 
MCS and the extent of innovation in a particular context, such as new product development, rather 
than variations in innovation characteristics (Davila et al., 2009). This study addresses this gap by 
investigating how MCS are used by top management in firms that pursue either or both exploration 
and exploitation. The study also extends the stream of research into the levers of control framework. 
By examining the full range of levers this study reveals how control systems are used individually and 
in combination to enhance the performance effects of innovation. The results show that control levers 
in firms that specialize in one mode of innovation have supplementary rather than complementary 
effects on performance. Interactive control use is found to be associated with performance in 
exploration firms while exploitation firms tend to benefit from emphasizing diagnostic and boundary 
systems. In ambidexterity firms that jointly pursue exploitation and exploration, it is the balanced and 





This study is subject to certain limitations. First, as this study uses data obtained from a survey 
instrument it may be affected by common method bias. However, significant attention was given to 
construct development and survey implementation, while diagnostic tests suggest that any bias is 
unlikely to be a significant concern. Second, given the cross-sectional nature of this study, only the 
contemporaneous position of a firm with respect to exploitation and exploration is considered. This 
assumes that the strategic position of a firm with respect to innovation is relatively stable over time 
(Cao et al., 2009). Although some firms in the sample may be in the process of strategic shifts, the 
number in transition is likely to be relatively small. Future research could examine how MCS are 
implicated in shifting between exploitation and exploration modes. Third, the distinction between 
exploration and exploitation in this study relates to the strategic emphasis a firm places on particular 
innovation priorities, but does not directly capture the different types of learning, patterns of 
knowledge search, and firm resources and capabilities that are conceptually associated with these 
innovation modes. Exploration and exploitation should also not be confused with incremental and 
radical innovation. While the former refer to the ex-ante objectives of the firm, the latter relate to ex-
post outcomes (He and Wong, 2004). Future research could analyze how these different individual 
and firm attributes are related in understanding more specifically the influence of MCS on 
organizational capabilities and performance outcomes. 
 
The fourth limitation relates to the measurement of firm performance. In this study performance is 
assessed through a subjective instrument that captures a limited spectrum of dimensions. The results 
should be interpreted with care regarding possible biases in the measure. Fifth, the analysis is 
concerned only with the consequences of control use given the innovation mode of the firm. 
Antecedents to the choice of controls and innovation types are not examined as this poses conflicting 
methodological assumptions (Gerdin and Greve, 2008). Sixth, interactive and diagnostic levers are 
conceptualized in terms of the use of accounting based controls. Although this is consistent with 
recent literature (Henri, 2006; Widener, 2007) it would be interesting to examine alternate 
mechanisms across different innovation types to assess whether there are effective control substitutes. 
The study is also limited to the firm level of analysis. While prior studies have given attention to the 
role and consequences of MCS at operational levels (e.g. Jørgensen and Messner, 2009), there is 
likely much to learn from the dynamics between control structures at different organizational levels in 













































































   Total 
 
400 
   Panel B: Industry 
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Factor analysis of reflective constructs 
          
Panel A: Diagnostic Control     
  Identify critical performance measures  0.784   
  Set targets  0.799   
  Monitor progress  0.839   
  Correct deviations from targets  0.758   
  Review key areas of performance  0.756   
     
Eigenvalue  3.48   
Variance explained  69.6%   
Cronbach’s Alpha  0.89   
KMO Sampling Adequacy  0.859   
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity  0.000   
     





  Being first to market 0.849 
 
0.222 
  Developing new generation capabilities  0.816 
 
0.285 
  Frequent new product introductions  0.803 
 
0.216 
  Experimenting with new products  0.682 
 
0.221 
  Opening up new markets  0.700 
 
0.250 





















   Eigenvalue  3.82 
 
1.99 








KMO Sampling Adequacy 
 
0.846 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity 
 
0.000 
     Panel C: Firm Performance 
     Financial performance  0.786 
    Sales growth of new markets  0.620 
    Sales growth of existing markets  0.592 
    Relative market share  0.628 
    Overall performance  0.933 
  
     Eigenvalue 3.08 
  Variance explained  61.6% 
  Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
0.84 
  KMO Sampling Adequacy 
 
0.776 
  Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity 
 
0.000 
            
     a Extraction method: Maximum-Likelihood. 
b Rotation method: Direct Oblimin with Kaiser normalization. 
c Bold indicates the loadings of the items that represent the factor. 









             
        
Actual Range  Theoretical Range 




































































































































    
           
             DIAG: emphasis on diagnostic control systems; INT: emphasis on interactive control systems; BOUND: 
emphasis on boundary control systems; BELIEF: emphasis on belief control systems; EXPLOIT: extent to 
which the firm pursues exploitation; EXPLORE: extent to which the firm pursues exploration; PERF: 
subjective assessment of firm performance; AGE: dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is at least 20 years 
old, otherwise 0; SIZE: natural logarithm of the number of employees in the firm; ENVHOST: degree of 































        
Panel A: Innovation focus         










207.88 0.000 C4,C5>C1,C3>C2 










343.68 0.000 C3,C5>C1>C4>C2 
      
   
Panel B: Control levers 
     
   










6.35 0.000 C5*>C1,C2,C3* 










14.68 0.000 C5>C1,C2,C3,C4; 
C3,C4>C2 










5.44 0.000 C3,C4*,C5>C1*; 
C5>C2 










5.34 0.000 C5*>C1,C2,C4* 
         
      
   
EXPLOIT: extent to which the firm pursues exploitation; EXPLORE: extent to which the firm pursues exploration; DIAG: emphasis on diagnostic control systems; 
INT: emphasis on interactive control systems; BOUND: emphasis on boundary control systems; BELIEF: emphasis on belief control systems. 
a Standard deviations reported in parentheses. 








Pearson correlations between variables 
  DIAG INT BOUND BELIEF EXPLOIT EXPLORE PERF AGE SIZE ENVHOST ENVDYN 
            DIAG 1           
INT   .645*** 1          
BOUND   .264***   .358*** 1         
BELIEF   .233***   .367***   .474*** 1        
EXPLOIT   .296***   .329***   .231***   .226*** 1       
EXPLORE   .144***   .269***   .149***   .173***   .273*** 1      
PERF   .303***   .334***   .190***   .277***   .268***   .261*** 1     
AGE   .101**   .065   .121**   .116**   .066   .024   .112** 1    
SIZE   .051   .158***   .042   .140***   .066 –.016   .077   .174*** 1   
ENVHOST   .029   .138***   .078   .132***   .185***   .170***   .020 –.085*   .081 1  
ENVDYN –.061 –.007   .115**   .045   .155***   .186*** –.133*** –.022 –.018   .264*** 1 
  
           
 DIAG: emphasis on diagnostic control systems; INT: emphasis on interactive control systems; BOUND: emphasis on boundary control systems; BELIEF: 
emphasis on belief control systems; EXPLOIT: extent to which the firm pursues exploitation; EXPLORE: extent to which the firm pursues exploration; PERF: 
subjective assessment of firm performance; AGE: dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is at least 20 years old, otherwise 0; SIZE: natural logarithm of the 
number of employees in the firm; ENVHOST: degree of hostility in the firm's environment; ENVDYN: degree of dynamism in the firm's environment. 
* p < .10 (two-tailed). 
** p < .05 (two-tailed). 








Results of OLS Regressions of Control Levers on Firm Performance for Exploitation and Exploration Subgroups 
 
Exploitation Subgroup (N = 80) Exploration Subgroup (N = 61) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
         Control Levers 
        DIAG   0.295   2.079**   0.314   2.220**   0.002 –0.011   0.002   0.011 
INT –0.008 –0.053 –0.039 –0.253   0.323   2.214**   0.317   2.029** 
BOUND   0.273   2.300**   0.258   2.119** –0.253 –1.729* –0.250 –1.659 
BELIEF   0.093   0.786   0.091   0.771   0.247   1.606   0.232   1.448 
         Interaction Terms 










         Firm Controls 
        AGE   0.161   1.499   0.171   1.596   0.134   1.109   0.152   1.181 
SIZE   0.007   0.065   0.002   0.021   0.224   1.779*   0.211   1.609 
ENVHOST –0.065 –0.593 –0.090 –0.819 –0.073 –0.598 –0.070 –0.555 
ENVDYN –0.069 –0.632 –0.050 –0.449 –0.058 –0.451 –0.058 –0.435 
         R-Sq. 0.260 0.288 0.306 0.309 
Adj. R-Sq. 0.176 0.185 0.200 0.171 
F-Value 3.114 2.797 2.870 2.241 
Sig. F 0.005 0.006 0.010 0.030 
                  
         PERF: subjective assessment of firm performance; DIAG: emphasis on diagnostic control systems; INT: emphasis on interactive control systems; 
BOUND: emphasis on boundary control systems; BELIEF: emphasis on belief control systems; AGE: dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is at 
least 20 years old, otherwise 0; SIZE: natural logarithm of the number of employees in the firm; ENVHOST: degree of hostility in the firm's 
environment; ENVDYN: degree of dynamism in the firm's environment. 
a Standardized coefficients reported. 
* p < .10 (two-tailed). 
** p < .05 (two-tailed). 








Results of OLS Regressions of Control Levers on Firm Performance for Ambidexterity Subgroup 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
         Control Levers 
        DIAG   0.071   0.606   0.126   1.077   0.156   1.303   0.182   1.515 
INT   0.127   1.058   0.108   0.908   0.006   0.047   0.017   0.131 
BOUND   0.097   0.096   0.095   0.953   0.112   1.107   0.098   0.959 
BELIEF   0.221   2.198**   0.206   1.952*   0.173   1.729*   0.166   1.556 
         Interaction Terms 
        
         DIAG x INT 
  
  0.223   2.398** 
  
  0.169   1.735* 





         Difference Terms 
        ABS[DIAG - INT] 
    
–0.244 –2.519** –0.186 –1.833* 
ABS[BOUND - BELIEF] 
    
  0.001   0.013 –0.029 –0.314 
         Firm Controls 
        AGE –0.115 –1.232 –0.062 –0.661 –0.107 –1.172 –0.070 –0.748 
SIZE   0.153   1.646*   0.163   1.785*   0.165   1.811*   0.172   1.891** 
ENVHOST   0.017   0.183   0.021   0.230   0.060   0.646   0.056   0.610 
ENVDYN –0.291 –3.188*** –0.274 –3.039*** –0.309 –3.447*** –0.291 –3.238*** 
         R-Sq. 0.266 0.309 0.312 0.335 
Adj. R-Sq. 0.204 0.235 0.239 0.249 
F-Value 4.340 4.194 4.273 3.866 
Sig. F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
                  
         PERF: subjective assessment of firm performance; DIAG: emphasis on diagnostic control systems; INT: emphasis on interactive control systems; 
BOUND: emphasis on boundary control systems; BELIEF: emphasis on belief control systems; ABS[DIAG-INT]: absolute difference between the 
emphasis on diagnostic and interactive control systems; ABS[BOUND-BELIEF]: absolute difference between the emphasis on boundary and 
belief control systems; AGE: dummy indicating whether the firm is at least 20 years old (1) or not (0); SIZE: natural logarithm of the number of 
employees in the firm; ENVHOST: degree of hostility in the firm's environment; ENVDYN: degree of dynamism in the firm's environment. 
a Standardized coefficients reported. 
* p < .10 (two-tailed). 
** p < .05 (two-tailed). 










    
1. Diagnostic Control Systems   
    
To what extent does the top management team use budgets and performance measures for 
the following 
 Very low extent / Very high extent 
    
1.1 Identify critical performance variables (i.e. factors that indicate achievement of 
current strategy) 
  
1.2 Set targets for critical performance variables   
1.3 Monitor progress towards critical performance targets   
1.4 Provide information to correct deviations from preset performance targets   
1.5 Review key areas of performance   
    
2. Interactive Control Systems   
    
To what extent does the top management team use budgets and performance measures for 
the following 
 Very low extent / Very high extent 
    
2.1 Provide a recurring and frequent agenda for top management activities   
2.2 Provide a recurring and frequent agenda for subordinate activities   
2.3 Enable continual challenge and debate of underlying data, assumptions and action 
plans with subordinates and peers 
  
2.4 Focus attention on strategic uncertainties (i.e. factors that may invalidate current 
strategy or provide opportunities for new strategic initiatives) 
  
2.5 Encourage and facilitate dialogue and information sharing with subordinates   
    
3. Boundary Control Systems   
    
To what extent…  Very low extent / Very high extent 
    
3.1 Are codes of conduct or similar statements relied upon to define appropriate 
behaviour? 
  
3.2 Are there policies or guidelines that stipulate specific areas for, or limits on, 
opportunity search and experimentation? 
  
3.3 Does top management actively communicate risks and activities to be avoided by 
subordinates? 
  
3.4 Are sanctions or punishments applied to subordinates who engage in risks and 
activities outside organisational policy, irrespective of the outcome? 
  
    
4. Belief Control Systems   
    
To what extent…  Very low extent / Very high extent 
    
4.1 Are the values, purpose and direction of the SBU codified in formal documents? 
(e.g. mission/value statements, credos, statements of purpose?) 
  
4.2 Does top management actively communicate core values to subordinates?   
4.3 Are formal statements of values used to create commitment to the long-term vision 
of top management? 
  
4.4 Are formal statements of values used to motivate and guide subordinates in 
searching for new opportunities? 
  
    
5. Exploitation and Exploration   
    
Indicate the emphasis your SBU places on the following strategic priorities relative to your 
competitors 
 Very low emphasis / Very high 
emphasis 
    
5.1 Low cost products / services *   
5.2 Being first to market with new products / services   




5.4 Frequent new product / service introductions   
5.5 Experimenting with new products / services   
5.6 Improving quality of existing products / services   
5.7 Frequent, but incremental, modifications to existing products / services   
5.8 Improving efficiency in the provision of existing products / services   
5.9 Opening up new product / service markets   
5.10 Increasing economies of scale in existing product / service markets   
    
 * This item is dropped from the analysis   
    
6. Firm Performance   
    
Rate the performance of your SBU on the following dimensions to that of your competitors 
over the past year 
 Significantly below average / 
Significantly above average 
6.1 Financial performance   
6.2 Sales growth of new (less than 2 years) product / service markets   
6.3 Sales growth of existing (older than 2 years) product / service markets   
6.4 Relative market share for primary products / services   
6.5 Overall performance   
    
7. Environmental Hostility   
    
7.1 How intense is the competition for your main products/services?  Very low intensity / Very high intensity 
7.2 How difficult is it to obtain the necessary inputs for your business?  Very low difficulty / Very high difficulty 
7.3 How many strategic opportunities are currently available to your business?  Very few / Very many 
    
8. Environmental Dynamism   
    
Over the past three years how predictable or unpredictable have important actions or changes 
in the external environment been? 
 Very predictable / Very unpredictable 
Over the past three years how many changes have occurred that have had a material impact 
on the nature of your business? 
 Very few changes / Very many 
changes 
8.1 Customers (e.g. Level of demand, customer requirements)   
8.2 Suppliers (e.g. Markets for key inputs, quality of resources)   
8.3 Competitors (e.g. Competitors entering or leaving, tactics/strategies)   
8.4 Technological (e.g. R&D advances, process innovations)   
8.5 Economic / Regulatory   
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